University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

7-10-1942

Miller v. Dyer
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Miller v. Dyer 20 Cal.2d 526 (1942).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/67

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

II

..

I~

t),

l~

526

Mrr:.t.ER

v.

DYER

July 1942]

[20 C; (2d)

!

!

[L. A. No. 17908. In Bank. July 10, 1942.]

I
i

i
"I:

ItI,

iI
,'Iii,!~

I,'
~l ;j'
~ it

I!

'it
'i

:li

il·!

l!:"

1:
"

CURTIS E. MILLER et al., Appellants, v. MABELLE M. '
DYER et al., Respondents.
[1] Specific Performance-Defendant's Title ........While specific performance will not be decreed against a vendor: who has no
title or interest in the land that he contracts to convey, the,
rule is otherwise where he is the eqJlitable owner and has the
right to cajl for the legaltitle. Under this rule, specific performance may be decreed against a person where a limdowner
had agreed to convey property to him, and had deposited the
deed to' the property in escrow with the intention of passing'
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[2] ld.-Mutuality-Exceptions.-While a vendor may not force
a defective title on an unwilling purchaser or compel perform'ance while conditions precedent to his' recovery remain for
him to perform (Civ. Code, §§ 3392, 3394), he cannot defend
an action for specific performance .on the ground' that his title
is not so complete as the one he agreed to convey. If the
vendor has any interest in the property he has contracted to
COI).vey, the vendee, at his option, may enforce the contract
with respeet to whatever interest the vendor possesses,and may
also receive compensation for the deficiency in performance;
(Contrary statement in Linehan v. Devincense, 170 Cal. 307,
149 Pac. 584, disapproved.)
[3] Id.-Mutuality-Exceptions.-The rUle of mutuality of remedy declared in Civ. Code, § 3386, is not applicable where the
unavailability of the remedy to the party against whom specific
relief is sought resulted from his own default.
[4] ld.-Parties-Against Whom Relief Had.-Equity avoids circuity of action; and in an action for specific performance of a
contract to convey made by one who holds the equitable title
to land as the result of the landowner's agreement to convey
to him and the deposit of a deed to the property in escrow with
the intention of passing title, the laitdowner may be compelled
to convey the legal title to the plaintiff.
[5] ld.-;-Parties-Against Whom Relief Had-Lender and EScrow
Holdar.-Where a person agrees to I).egotiate a loan on realty
[2] See 23 Cal. Jur. 474; 25 R. C. L. 232.
[3] See 23 Cal. Jur. 448.
McK. Dig. R,eferences: [1] Specific Performance, § 15; [2, 3] Specific Performance, § 55; [4,5] Specific Performance, § 99; [6] Pleadjng, § 96; [7] Actions, § 43; [8] Frauds, Statute of, § 52.
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owned by another and to transfer both the amount o:fthe l~an
and the realty to the other contracting party, where such ~o~n
secured by an encumbrance on the property is negotiated, and
where the amount of the loan' and a deed by the landowner
are delivered to a title, company in escrow, in an action for
specific performance of the contract the determination of the
interests of the lender and the escrow holder is, necessary, .to
give the plaintiff proper relief and to avoid circuity, of action,
and the complaint states a cause of action against them.
[6] Pleading-Demurrer-Specification in Special Demurrer~A
special demurrer for misjoinder of parties and, causes of action
~ust specify wherein the misjoinder exists.
'
[7] Abtiona.......Joinder-Single Cause of Action-E:frect of Relief
Sought.-A complaint for specific performance of an agreement to convey real property and for damages occasion,ed by
delay in performance states a single cause of action. The repudiation of the contract gives rise to a single cause of action
regardless of the remedies available.
[8] Frauds, Statute of-Oral Modification of Written Contract;Specific performance of a written agreement to exchange real
property is not prevented by Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. 4, merely
because of the fact that a supplementary oral agreement to
make up in cash the amount of the loan deducted by the lender
may be unenforceable.'

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Orange
County. Franklin G. West, Judge. Reversed.
Action for specific performance of a contract for exchange
of realty and for damages occasioned by delay. Judgment ,of
dismissal, following the refusal to amend after the sustaining
,of demurrers to the second amended complaint, reversed..
John A. Jorgenson for Appellants.
Howard F. Shepherd and Harvey, Rimel & Harvey for
Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-In this action for specific performance of
a contract for the exchange of real property and for damages
occasioned by delay in performance, the trial court sustained
'general and special demurrers to the' second amended complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiffs have appealed from
judgments of dismissal entered upon their refusal to amend.
[S] See 12 Cal. Jur. 925.
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The complaint sets forth the following allegations: Defendant Mabelle Dyer agreed by written contract to pay the
plaintiffs $250, to convey to them certain real property that
she owned, to negotiate a loan of $2,000 on a parcel of realty
owned by defendants Hector and Elizabeth Dyer,. a'nd to
transfer both the amount of the loan and the' realty to plaintiffs in return for a conveyance to her of certain real property owned by one of the plaintiffs. The value or the latter
property approximates that of the properties and the cash
that she was to transfer to them. Mabelle Dyer at the same
time entered into a written contract with Hector and Elizabeth Dyer whereby the latter agreed to convey to her their
real property, and she agreed to pay for it by executing and
delivering to them a $3,000 trust deed on the property that
she was to receive from plaintiffs. Appropriate deeds were
deposited in escrow including one executed and delivered by
Hector and Elizabeth Dyer "with the intention of passing
title" to their property to Mabelle Dyer. The escrow clerk,
however, returned that deed to Hector Dyer for a clerical
correction without the knowledge or consent of plaintiffs.
Mabelle Dyer obtained a loan of $2,000 from the defendant
Laguna Federal Savings and Loan Association secured by
a trust deed on the property. The lender required, however,
that $500 of the loan be deducted and retained to cover the
cost of repairs it deemed necessary. Mabelle Dyer agreed
orally with the plaintiffs to make up the deduction in cash.
The balance of the loan was transmitted to the defendant
Title Insurance & Guarantee Company to be held by it for
the parties entitled thereto upon the completion of the entire
transaction. Defendants Mabelle, Hector, and Elizabeth Dyer
have repudiated the transaction. Hector and Elizabeth Dyer
refuse to redeliver their deed in escrow and, Mabelle Dyer
has instructed the title company not to pay to plaintiffs the
loan funds it has on hand. The title company and the loan
association claim to have an interest in the property adverse
to plaintiffs.
[1] In support of their general demurrers respondents contend that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against
Mabelle Dyer since it shows that she has no title to the land
she contracted to convey and that she cannot perform her
agreement to borrow $2,000 on the property and pay that
sum to plaintiffs. If the vendor has no title or interest in
the land that he contracts to convey he will not be required
specifically to perform. The decree would be of n.o avail for

.~

MILLER
[20

c.

v.

DYER

529

(2d) 526]

equity will not compel him to obtain title. (Title G'ltarantee
etc. 00. v. Henry, 208 Cal. 185 [280 Pac. 959]; Smith v.
Bangham, 156 Cal. 359 [104 Pac. 689].) If, hqwever, the
vendor is the equitable owner and has the right to call for
the legal title, specific performance will be decreed at the
suit of his vendee. (Farnum v. Olarke, 148 Cal. 610 [84 Pac.
166] ; Easton v. Montgomery, 90 Cal. 307 [27 Pac. 280, 25
Am. St. Rep. 123]; M'Donald v. Yungbluth, 46 Fed. 836;
Miedema v. Wormho1tdt, 288 Ill. 537 [123 N. E. 954 ] ; Outler
v. Lovinger, 212 Mich. 272 [180 N. W. 462]. See, also, Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts, 3d ed., p. 667). When
Hector jlnd Elizabeth Dyer agreed to convey their real property to Mabelle Dyer, and deposited the deed to such property
in escrow, "with the intention of passing title," Mabelle Dyer
became the equitable owner of the land and Hector and
Elizabeth Dyer held the legal title in trust for her as purchaser. (Keese v. Beardsley, 190 Cal. 465 [213 Pac. 500, 26
A. L. R. 1538]; Jackson v. Torrence, 83 Cal. 521 [23 Pac.
695] ; Gilbert v. Sleeper, 71 Cal. 290 [12 Pac. 172].) Mabelle
Dyer could convey that equitable interest or title, (Rogers
Etc. 00. v. Southern Oalifornia Eto. 00., 159 Cal. 735 [115
Pac. 934, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 543]; Easton v. Montgomery,
supra), and she can be compelled to do so in this action for
specific performance.
[2] Mabelle Dyer's inability to convey to plaintiffs complete
title to the land that she contracted to purchase from Hector
and Elizabeth Dyer, and her inability to transfer to plaintiffs the entire proceeds of the loan would prevent her from
specifically enforcing her contract with plaintiffs since a
vendor may not force a defective title on an unwilling purchaser or compel performance while conditio:ris~reced~nt to
his recovery remain for him to perform. (Civ. Code §§ 3394,
3392. See, also, 23 Cal. Jur. 474). She cannot, however, defend this action on the ground that her title. is not so complete as the one she agreed to convey. If the vendor has any
interest in the property that he has contracted to' convey, the
vendee, at his option, lllay enforce the contract with respect
to whatever interest the vendor possesses, and m:ay also receive compensation for the deficiency in perfQrniance.
(Smiddy v. Grafton, 163 Cal. 16 [124 Pac. 433, Ann. Cas.
1913 E. 921); lJ'arn1tm v. Olarke,' supra; MoOowen v. Pew,
147 Cal. 299 [81 Pac. 958l;Easton v. Montgomery, s1ipra;
Swain v. Bu.rnette, 76 Cal. 299 [18 Pac. 394]; Marshall v;
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Caldwell, 41 Cal. 611. See, also, Pomeroy, Specific Performance of Contracts, 3d ed., p. 900). In Linehan v. Devincense,
170 Cal. 307 [149 Pac. 584], the vendee failed to show an
existing contract and his unexplained laches precluded any
right to specific performance. The statement in the opinion
that "as she [the vendor] could not have compelled specific
performance of the contract, so specific performance may
not be enforced against her ... [citing Civ. Code § 3386]"
was not necessary to the decis:ionof the case, and is without
support in the authorities. It is therefore disapproved by our
decision herein. [3] Section 3386 of the Civil Code, which states
that "Neither party to an obligation can be compelled specifically to perform it, unless the other party thereto has performed, or is compellable specifically to perform, everything
to which the former is entitled under the same Obligation ... " codifies the rule of mutuality of remedy that was
well established in equity jurisprudence at the time of the
adoption of the code. (See, 23 Cal. Jur.448.) That rule was
never considered applicable where the unavailability of the
remedy to the party against whom relief was sought resulted
from his own default. (Smiddy v. Grafton, supra; Farnum
v. Clarke, supra; McCowen v. Pew, supra; Easton v. Montgomery, supra; Swain v. Burnette, supra; Marshall v. Caldwell, supra,' Armstrong v. Sacramento V. R. Co., 52 Cal. App.
110 [198 Pac. 217]. See, also, 28 Cal. L. Rev. 503; 16 Cal.
L. Rev. 541; Pomeroy, Specific Performance, 3d ed., p. 903
(1926); 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., p. 457
(1918».
[4] It is contended that the complaint fails to state a cause
of action against Hector and Elizabeth Dyer since they were
not parties to the contract that plaintiffs seek specifically to
enforce. They hold the legal title to the land sought to be
conveyed, however, as trustees for Mabelle Dyer. Since the
latter may be compelled to convey her equitable interest in
the land to plaintiffs and since equity avoids cirCUity of
action, Hector and Elizabeth Dyer may be compelled to convey the legal title to them. (M'Donald v. Yungbluth, supra,'
Miedema v. Wormhoudt, supra,' see 33 Harv. L. Rev. 822.)
[5] It is also contended that the complaint fails to state a
cause of action against the title company and the loan association. The title company holds the proceeds of the loan for
the benefit of the party entitled thereto Upon the completion
of the transaction. The loan association made the loan, trans-
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mitted the proceeds to the title company, and received a trust
deed on the land involved. The asserted adverse interests of
both defendants in the property arose out of transactions
with the principal defendant, Mabelle Dyer, concerning her
contract with the plaintiffs. Those interests must. be .determined to give plaintiffs proper relief and to avoid' circuity
of action.
'.,
[6] The special demurrer of defend~nts title company: and
loan association on the grounds of misjoinder of parties defendant and of improper uniting of several causes of action
fails to specify wherein the alleged misjoinder exists. (Healy
v. Visalia &7 T. R. Co., 101 Cal. 585 [36 Pac. 125].) [71The i special demurrer of defendants Dyer on the. ground that ca~ses
of action for specific per~ormance and for breach{)fanltgr~e~
mentto convey real property have been united improperly
fails to take into account that the repudiation of the con,tract
gave, rise to a single cause of action reg~rdless of the "re:me~
dies available to plaintiffs. (Abbott v. 7q .Land &7 Water Co"
161CaL42 [118 Pac. 425] ; San Diego Wa~er Co. v"SanDiego
Flume Co., 108 Cal. 549 [41 ;Pac. 495, 29L.<R.A;839];)
[8] The contention that the alleged calise of action is barred
by the provisions of subdivision 40'£ section 1624 of the Civil
Code because apart of the alleged agreement for the exchange
of real property was not in writing· is·' untenable, The . fact
that Mabelle Dyer's supplementary oral agreement to make
up in cash the amount of the loan deducted by the lender
may be unenforceable ,.loes not prevent enforcement of the
written contract; (See cases cited in 12 Cal. JUl'. 925.)
The judgments are reversed.
Gibson, C.J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., concurred.

(L. A. 18222. In Bank. July 11, 1942.]

MANUEL A. MORENO, Appellant, v. JAMES CAIRNS·
~t al., Respondents.
[1] Municipal Oorporations-Officers and Employees-Removal~
Reinstatement-,-Oonditions Precedent.-'-A charter. provision
[1] See 12 Cal. Jur. 800; 6 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 60; 37 Am.
Jur.874.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Municipal Corporations,§313.

